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Abstract 
Post-autocratic transitions are often followed by constitutional conﬂ icts between state powers. With 
respect to the question of rule of law in young democracies, clashes between the executive and legislative 
branches, on the one hand, and the judiciary and constitutional courts, on the other, as well as those 
between ordinary and constitutional courts are particularly virulent. All these conﬂ icts have massively 
aﬀ ected the key distinction between politics and law that had been mainly violated in the previous 
autocratic regimes. Based on Niklas Luhmann’s theory, this article presents a systems-theoretical 
approach in order to explain the occurrence of these constitutional conﬂ icts. The central argument 
reads as follows: constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur under two circumstances—
if a constitutional order allows the decision of legal questions based on political criteria or vice versa, 
and if a constitutional order allows the judiciary or the constitutional court to decide political questions 
based on political criteria. This argument is further substantiated by means of two exploratory case 
studies with a special emphasis on post-socialist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. The main 
results are eight detailed hypotheses on the question of when, in constitutional orders, and under what 
circumstances are constitutional conﬂ icts to be expected.
Keywords: constitutional conﬂ icts, democratisation, transition, systems theory, Central and 
Eastern Europe.
Introduction
Post-autocratic transitions are often followed by constitutional conﬂ icts between state powers. In a 
general sense, these conﬂ icts can be deﬁ ned as quarrels in which either two or more actors draw upon 
the same constitutional competence or one actor claims a competence that draws the disapproval 
of another. So far, political scientists have mainly focused on such conﬂ icts between twin-headed 
executives or between governments and parliaments, insofar as such clashes have aﬀ ected the core of 
the democratic institutional order. In contrast, the relationships between the executive and legislative 
branches, on the one hand, and the judiciary and constitutional courts, on the other, as well as 
those between ordinary and constitutional courts have only rarely ﬁ gured on the research agenda. 
This especially holds true for comparative studies on politics and democratisation, where ‘blanket 
references to a lack or limitation of rule of law’ (Lauth & Sehring 2009: 166) often are the maximum level 
of attention. However, it is beyond dispute that ‘democracies cannot consolidate unless they create 
judicial institutions, mechanisms and remedies for a complete rule of law constructed by democratic 
means’ (Calleros 2009: 180). Therefore, it seems appropriate to expand the research perspective to 
constitutional conﬂ icts that incorporate judicial institutions.1
1  While Jasper de Raadt (2009b: 319) mentions the possibility of considering conﬂ icts ‘with regard to the role and 
competencies of constitutional courts’, he does not provide further discussion on this issue.
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A large variety of such conﬂ icts can be observed in the post-autocratic transitions of nations, 
especially those situated in the Central and Eastern European post-socialist region. For instance, from 
2002 to 2009, Bulgaria underwent a vigorous constitutional conﬂ ict concerning the opportunities 
for judicial reform. The judiciary and the constitutional court of Bulgaria gradually expanded their 
powers while reducing the political scope of the parliament and government by making constitutional 
amendments increasingly diﬃ  cult (see Hein 2006, 2007). A similar development occurred in Croatia 
in 2000/2001 with, however, much less success for the opponents of structural judicial reform (see 
Uzelac 2002). In 2006, the Czech Republic underwent a conﬂ ict regarding the question of whether 
the parliament should be allowed to stipulate continuing professional education for judges. The 
country’s constitutional court annulled this provision of the law on judges as unconstitutional, 
based on the conviction that it would interfere with the judiciary’s independence. The ‘fortress of 
judicial independence’ (Bobek 2008: 99) that protected the judiciary from any attempt of structural 
reform was thereby retained. A diﬀ erent conﬂ ict is currently in the spotlight in Romania, where the 
government, parliament, judiciary and the constitutional court have been struggling for a couple of 
years to obtain the power to ﬁ le complaints against members of government involved in criminal 
cases. By introducing extensive immunity rights for the said members of government, the Romanian 
constitution has established an era of virtual lawlessness. Until now, not a single former or current 
(prime) minister has been sentenced for any sort of crime, including and above all for corruption (see 
Hein 2009). A glance at the situation outside the post-socialist world reveals that in countries such 
as Spain, for example, there has been much politicisation of both the judicial self-administration and 
the appointment of the constitutional court members for the last several decades. This has resulted 
in a virulent and protracted conﬂ ict between the Supreme Court and the constitutional court that is 
literally known as a ‘Guerra de Cortes’ (see Hansen 2008).
All these conﬂ icts have massively aﬀ ected the key distinction between politics and law. In fact, it was 
this distinction that had been mainly violated in the previous autocratic regimes. So far, the problems of 
post-autocratic transitions and the relationship between politics and law have generally been explained 
at the informal level, that is, in terms of problematic political and legal cultures or the existence of 
clientelistic networks (see Gönenç 2002: 78-102, Grey 1997). This approach largely ignored the role played 
by formal institutions. In contrast, studies on formal institutional structures often misunderstand the 
eﬀ ects of these structures on both political inﬂ uences on the judicial sphere and vice versa. In most 
cases, these studies are primarily interested in the judiciary’s independence from political inﬂ uences 
exerted by the executive or legislative branches (see Calleros 2009, Melone 1996); they rarely recognise 
the possibility that the existence of an extensive degree of autonomy at the formal level, in combination 
with the absence of functioning checks and balances, will result in the phenomenon of the politicisation 
of judicial state organs through clientelistic networks (see Bobek 2008, Schönfelder 2005). To sum up, 
the literature so far lacks an overall explanation of the occurrence of constitutional conﬂ icts between 
political and legal institutions in transition societies.
Therefore, this article explores the following research question: which institutional rules enable or 
provoke constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law? In order to answer this question, this study 
will ﬁ rst present a systems-theoretical approach based on the theory of Niklas Luhmann. Through this, 
it will be demonstrated that the relationship between politics and law, when considered from a systems-
theoretical perspective, can provide researchers the opportunity to develop hypotheses for empirical 
studies, despite the common prejudices regarding the putative inability and unsuitability of Luhmann’s 
theory for empirical research (cf. Habermas 1990: 353-355, Esser 2007). The central argument deduced 
from this theory reads as follows: constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur under two 
circumstances—if a constitutional order allows the decision of legal questions based on political criteria 
or vice versa, and if a constitutional order allows the judiciary or the constitutional court to decide 
political questions based on political criteria. Second, due to their general and abstract character, these 
hypotheses will be further substantiated by means of two exploratory case studies. The article is thus 
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structured as a comparative, disciplined-conﬁ gurative study (see Verba 1967: 114-115, cf. Gerring 2004: 
348-349). Its goal is ‘theory elaboration’ in the sense of ‘reﬁ ning a theory, model or concept in order to 
specify more carefully the circumstances in which it does or does not oﬀ er potential for explanation’ 
(Vaughan 1992: 175). As the main result, the two general hypotheses will be expanded into eight detailed 
hypotheses on the question of when, in constitutional orders, and under what circumstances are 
constitutional conﬂ icts to be expected. These hypotheses are open to further empirical testing.
The following sections will ﬁ rst present the systems-theoretical understanding of politics, law and 
constitutional conﬂ icts in modern societies. Thereafter, the general hypotheses for this study will be 
deduced with respect to the special situation of transition societies. Then, the contents of the two 
case studies on constitutional conﬂ icts that have occurred in Bulgaria and Romania after 1991 will be 
brieﬂ y outlined, that is, the characteristics of these conﬂ icts will be discussed. On this twofold basis, 
the eight concrete hypotheses mentioned above will be derived. These hypotheses will pertain to the 
administration of the judiciary, that is, ordinary courts and the procuracy,2 the unlegislated areas of 
personal immunity in the legislative and executive branches, and the constitutional courts. Finally, the 
article concludes that constitutional conﬂ icts need not inevitably impede but may actually advance the 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law.
Politics, law and constitutional confl icts in the systems-theoretical perspective
Social sciences mostly take a sceptical view of using Luhmann’s systems theory to inform and guide 
empirical studies. In recent years, however, a number of sociologists, political scientists and legal 
scholars have emphasised that the systems theory provides ‘highly productive tools to draw an 
adequate picture of modern society’ and ‘to evaluate its present state and its future’ (John et al. 2010: 
8, cf. King 2006: 38). In the ﬁ eld of political science, systems theory is especially useful with regard to 
research questions that deal with the political system’s relationship with other spheres of society. This 
is because systems theory does not observe these other areas through ‘political glasses’ but perceives 
them as operating according to their own rules and logic. For the purpose of this article, there are 
three concrete advantages of this approach: First, it provides a viable understanding of politics, law, 
their mutual relationship and the role of the constitution. Second, systems theory enables political 
scientists to view the speciﬁ c situation of post-autocratic transitions as an attempt to discontinue the 
law’s subordination to politics—in other words, to usher in democracy and the rule of law. Third, this 
theory allows us to observe the role of formal institutions in constitutional conﬂ icts. In particular, it 
exposes the political aspects of intrinsically judicial institutions like the procuracy or ordinary courts.
Politics, law and the constitution in functionally diﬀ erentiated modern societies
From the systems-theoretical perspective, the term functionally diﬀ erentiated modern society describes 
the type of society that has emerged since the early modern period in large parts of Europe, North 
America and some other parts of the world. With regard to politics and law, this society is characterised 
by democracy and the rule of law. There are several types of operationally closed functional systems, 
each of them performing a speciﬁ c function in society. The function of the political system is to provide 
the capacity to take collectively binding decisions. The function of the legal system is to establish and 
stabilise normative expectations (Luhmann 2000: 86, 2004: 148). Based on this diﬀ erentiation of social 
communication, modern societies have achieved a much higher level of complexity than pre-modern 
2  Despite its connotation of Soviet-style constitutional orders, I have followed the terminological suggestion of 
Anne van Aaken, Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt (2004) and used the general term ‘procuracy’ instead of its 
manifold synonyms such as ‘prosecution oﬃ  ce’, ‘prosecution service’, ‘attorney’ and so on. See also Aaken et al. 
(2010).
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societies, which were vertically diﬀ erentiated into a stratiﬁ ed pattern. In functionally diﬀ erentiated 
societies, constitutions serve as the structural coupling for politics and law (see Luhmann 1990, 1991). 
In particular, constitutions solve certain virulent problems associated with two aspects of these 
functional systems: (1) their autonomy and (2) their self-reference.
(1) One of the central assumptions of Luhmann’s theory is that systems are autonomous, that 
is, they are not able to determine each other. Autonomous functional systems develop their speciﬁ c 
identity by producing a binary communication code, through which they are able to distinguish 
themselves from their environment. The code of the legal system is legal/illegal. The basic code of 
the political system is power/no power. With the development of modern democracies, this code has 
been re-coded to ﬁ t the scheme of government/opposition (Luhmann 2004: 94; 2000: 97-102). This code 
deﬁ nes all the important positions of power at the centre of the political system. Due to the coding, 
functional systems may connect only to their own acts of communication. They are only responsive 
to irritations from outside if they can ‘translate’ these irritations into their own communicative 
pattern, that is, if they are able to subsume them under their own binary code. Social systems are, 
therefore, operationally closed but cognitively open—they are autopoietic but not autarkic. In fact, 
they are permanently inﬂ uenced by the outside and are dependent upon several services performed 
by their environment. Furthermore, functional systems not only are occasionally inter-related with 
each other but also develop permanent mutual expectations. These ‘coupling mechanisms are called 
structural couplings if a system presupposes certain features of its environment on an ongoing basis 
and relies on them structurally’ (Luhmann 2004: 382). The constitution is such a structural coupling. It 
deﬁ nes the way in which the political system is able to inﬂ uence the legal one, for example, through 
law-making, constitutional amendments, and establishing and modifying judicial institutions or 
appointments to oﬃ  ces. Moreover, the political system has the opportunity to use the law in order 
to achieve its political goals. In turn, it is concurrently obliged to observe particular legal norms. 
Additionally, it enjoys monopoly over the legitimate use of force for the implementation of judicial 
decisions. In short, ‘A constitution enables both the legal system to observe politics judicially and the 
political system to observe the law politically’ (Brodocz 2003: 86). However, this relation ‘is not that of 
Siamese twins who can only move together but rather that of billiard balls which often systematically 
jolt each other but because of this roll their separated ways’ (Luhmann 1990: 204).
(2) Apart from the autonomy problem, the binary coding of functional communication also 
provokes the problem of self-reference, that is, the code’s application to itself. In general, a code does 
not prohibit the access of any act of communication until it has clariﬁ ed what kind of communication 
is to be located on which side of the binary code—for example, what is legal and what is illegal. By 
itself, a code is merely an empty form, which necessarily has to be ﬁ lled with speciﬁ c programs. Above 
all, political programs—apart from ideologies and party platforms—are the government’s concrete 
commands to public administration. Laws, decrees, standing orders, contracts and the very constitution 
itself are the programs of the legal system (Luhmann 2000: 260-261, 2004: 192-196). However, even with 
its programming, a binary code is applicable to all social communication. Hence, to become a part of 
a functional system, an act of communication also has to be code-orientated. Without this, the law 
would be identical to the entire society as even the programmed code of legal/illegal is applicable to 
any communication: that what is not illegal is legal—and vice versa. Therefore, only ‘[i]f the question 
arises whether something is legal or illegal, the communication belongs to the legal system, and if 
not then not’ (Luhmann 1991: 1428). The same holds true for the political system, which—without 
programming and code-orientation—would not be prohibited from politicising any problem in society 
(see Luhmann 2000: 96-102). In sum, it is only by using programs and code-orientated communication 
that functional systems are able to develop their speciﬁ c identities. However, even this does not solve 
the problem of the code’s application to itself. Therefore, the political and legal systems require the 
constitution. 
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For politics, the constitution is a ‘selective self-determination of the identity’ (Luhmann 1973: 172). 
The political system is externally limited by the introduction of basic rights. Due to the presence of 
these rights, large spheres of society become inaccessible or at least hardly accessible for political 
action. In its internal functioning, politics has to use law instead of violence in order to reach its goals 
(Luhmann 1990: 203, 2000: 213). Furthermore, the political system’s internal structure is designed by 
the constitution. At any given time, it is clear as to who is in power (the government) and who is not 
(the opposition). Although the opposition can mobilise its own power resources, it will deﬁ nitely 
never be able to exercise governmental power until and unless it crosses the line and itself becomes 
the government. In the end, the code of government/opposition cannot be applied to itself. Instead, 
politics is obliged to permanently examine the legality of its activities, especially the rules that 
deﬁ ne how to become the government. This result, or the ‘relevance of the diﬀ erence between legal 
and illegal for the political system’, constitutes the systems-theoretical understanding of the term 
democratic rule of law (Neves 2000: 76, cf. Luhmann 2004: 368). 
With regard to law, the constitution outsources the task of law making, to a large extent, to 
the political system. Furthermore, it resolves the problem of the variability of positive law: if a law 
can be amended at any time, who or what prevents the possibility that a certain legal norm will 
itself be illegal? Therefore, the constitution institutionalises several diﬀ erent, hierarchically related 
legal spheres with diﬀ erent amendment probabilities: constitutional law/ordinary laws/governmental 
decrees, national/municipal law, and sometimes federal/state law. With these, law is exposed to its 
own code. Legal norms may now be described as illegal, that is, unconstitutional, unlawful and so 
on. With regard to the highest-ranking constitutional law, however, the code of the legal system may 
no longer be applied to itself—constitutional law cannot be classiﬁ ed as legal or illegal.3 Via structural 
coupling, at this stage, we encounter the necessity of political decision-making.
In a nutshell, politics and law in functionally diﬀ erentiated modern societies have developed 
stable mutual expectations by institutionalising constitutions as their structural coupling. ‘Selections 
made in the legal sphere become relevant motivations for political communication and vice versa’ 
(Neves 2000: 77). However, neither of these systems is in a position to causally determine the other 
one, precisely because each side independently decides whether to apply its code to a certain act of 
communication. With regard to the operational capability of such an arrangement, it is quite clear 
that the concrete rules provided by a certain constitution are decisive. In other words, there can be 
diﬀ erent qualities of structural couplings between politics and law. This is especially true for newly 
established constitutions in transition societies, where politics and law tend to have a somewhat 
problematic relationship.
Politics, law and constitutional conﬂ icts in autocratic modern societies and post-autocratic 
transitions
In order to study the speciﬁ c situation of post-autocratic transitions, we have to look at their starting 
point: the autocratic modern society. In these societies, regardless of whether the political regimes 
were rightist as in Latin America and Southern Europe or socialist as in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
diﬀ erentiation between law and politics has been more or less abrogated in favour of the latter.4 For 
an adequate understanding of such a society, it is appropriate to use the systems-theoretical concept 
of peripheral modernity as developed by Marcelo Neves (2000: 178-183, 2001: 254-263). The description 
of the relationship between politics and law in the previous section reﬂ ects upon a constellation that 
has only developed in large parts of Europe, North America and some other regions of the world so 
3  An exception in this case would be the concept of unconstitutional constitutional law. This term describes the 
problem that coequal law should not be contradictory. This, however, is a diﬀ erent phenomenon from the self-
reference paradox of illegal law in the systems-theoretical sense.
4  For socialist states, see Pollack (1990: 293–297); for rightist autocracies, see Ginsburg & Moustafa (2008).
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far. Even today, evidently, the structural coupling of politics and law ‘is the exception by which the 
few centres of world society diﬀ er from the predominant peripheries’ (Brodocz 2003: 88). In the latter, 
we can observe ‘the permanent and generalised impediment to the reproduction of the legal system 
created by a broad variety of social factors such as money, power and relationships’ (Neves 2001: 242). 
In autocratic modern societies, one of these factors—power—is predominant; in other words, the legal 
system is hierarchically subordinated to the political system. Therefore, the political system is either 
characteristically not or only marginally bound to adhere to legal rules. Moreover, the legal system 
can fulﬁ l its function of establishing and stabilising normative expectations only to a limited extent in 
such societies. This is because the legal system’s lack of autonomy always allows the political system 
to decide matters of legality and illegality whenever it wants to. Thus, in autocratic societies there is 
no rule of law but rule by law (see Figure 1). In some cases, there are even constitutions which, to a 
large extent, formally respect the principles of democracy and the rule of law. In practice, however, 
‘there is a lack of constitutional normativity consistent with the constitutional text’ (Neves 2001: 260). 
Accordingly, transition societies are faced with the following task: if they introduce democracy 
and the rule of law, they discontinue the law’s subordination to politics. However, a newly formed 
or reformed constitution alone will not be able to achieve the diﬀ erentiation and operational closure 
of the political and legal systems. In addition, many other social structures, for instance the political 
and legal cultures, will need to change. The constitution can only facilitate the conjunction of both 
systems with respect to their structural coupling (Luhmann 2000: 382). In brief, constitutions are 
not only a product of the functional diﬀ erentiation of politics and law but also the supporters and 
perpetuators of this diﬀ erentiation; however, they cannot produce it (Luhmann 1990: 213). Naturally, 
this diﬀ erentiation process cannot be completed overnight with the formal enactment of a new 
constitution. Instead, the democratic transition that follows the liberalisation or breakdown of 
autocracy can be distinguished into two ideal-typical phases (see O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986):
(1) The ﬁ rst democratisation phase is characterised by either the formation and implementation 
of a new constitution or step-by-step modiﬁ cations of an existing basic law. New institutions are 
successively established in this perennial phase, and they start functioning according to the logic of 
the simultaneously closing functional systems. At this most important stage of transition, the law not 
only has to fulﬁ l the function of establishing and stabilising normative expectations but also has to 
advance the transition process itself (cf. Teitel 2005). 
(a)
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Figure 1: Politics and law in (a) autocratic modern societies and (b) functionally diﬀ erentiated 
modern societies
Source: author’s illustration
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(2) In the subsequent consolidation phase, the functional systems have successfully ﬁ nalised their 
operational closure. Ideally, the new constitution will now provide ‘a form that can be read doubly, 
that both sides [i.e. the political and legal systems] can handle diﬀ erently, without continuously 
provoking unsolvable conﬂ icts’ (Luhmann 2000: 392).
It is in this phase, however, that instead of a smooth consolidation, we often observe constitutional 
conﬂ icts like the ones mentioned at the outset of this article. In a general systems-theoretical sense, 
conﬂ icts are an ‘operative autonomization of a contradiction’. They occur ‘when expectations are 
communicated and the nonacceptance of the communication is communicated in return’ (Luhmann 
1995: 388). With reference to the general deﬁ nition given at the beginning of this article, constitutional 
conﬂ icts between politics and law can now be more speciﬁ cally understood as quarrels in which 
contradicting expectations of the political and the legal systems referring to the constitution collide with 
each other. These conﬂ icts, then, often become long-standing when they replace the original system 
reference (i.e. politics or law) with the new one of ‘friend vs. foe’. This is especially problematic 
because the legal system normally oﬀ ers independent conﬂ ict resolution and termination to other 
spheres of society. However, in these conﬂ icts, the legal system is itself involved as an opposing party. 
As a consequence, conﬂ ict resolution becomes a diﬃ  cult undertaking, if not impossible. 
However, a collision between politics and law will occur only if the constitutional structures are 
inappropriate and do not suﬃ  ciently account for the autonomy of both systems. This is especially 
true if politics and law are structurally coupled, but the diﬀ ering logic of the two systems is not 
suﬃ  ciently reﬂ ected in the actual way the constitution interrelates politics and law. Above all, this 
argument focuses on the conﬁ guration of certain state organs and their mutual relationships. These 
organisations do not appertain to just one of the functional systems, that is, either politics or law. In 
fact, the diﬀ erent forms of modern social systems (functional systems, organisations, interactions and 
so on) are not congruent with each other: public administration organs buy computers, parliaments 
edit newspapers, business companies lobby and churches issue political statements; in other words, 
diﬀ erent organs act across several functional systems. To ensure the functionality of a constitution 
and the diﬀ erentiation of politics and law it is necessary, however, that the diﬀ erent state organs fulﬁ l 
their constitutionally aﬃ  liated tasks. For organs which should, by deﬁ nition, primarily communicate 
in the legal system, the decisive question is whether they predominantly administer justice and 
prosecute criminal oﬀ enses or pursue politics. This particularly holds true for ordinary courts, the 
procuracy and the organs entrusted with the administration of the judiciary, that is, the ministry of 
justice or special self-administration councils. For ‘political’ organs, the converse question holds true: 
whether they concentrate on political decision-making or decide judicial questions. This especially 
pertains to parliaments, governments and heads of state.
Based on these considerations, we can now formulate two general hypotheses (G) in order to 
explain the occurrence of constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law in transition societies:
Hypothesis G1: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if a constitutional 
order allows for the decision of legal questions based on political criteria or political questions 
based on legal criteria.
Hypothesis G2: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if a constitutional order 
provides the judiciary or the constitutional court the opportunity to decide political questions 
based on political criteria.
The conﬂ ict-provoking capacity of the cases covered by hypothesis G1 is directly caused by the 
intermixture of the diﬀ ering functional logic of politics and law. In the cases described by hypothesis 
G2, conﬂ icts are provoked by the absence of the political (i.e. democratic) legitimacy of political 
decisions taken by legal institutions.
10 Michael Hein
Two case studies: Constitutional confl icts in Bulgaria and Romania since 1991
In order to generate more concrete hypotheses on the question of when, in constitutional orders, 
and under what circumstances constitutional conﬂ icts are to be expected, this article presents two 
exploratory case studies. Although these studies focus on post-socialist transitions in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the hypotheses obtained may be valid for post-autocratic transitions, in general. The 
two case studies contain the analyses of all the signiﬁ cant constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and 
law that have occurred in Bulgaria and Romania since 1991. These two countries have been selected 
because they were among the ﬁ rst post-socialist countries to introduce entirely new constitutions 
after 1989 and afterwards, to a certain extent, successfully implement democracy and the rule of law. 
The result of these case studies is twofold: First, the abovementioned hypotheses are able to explain 
all conﬂ icts analysed in the two countries, because one of the two hypothetical requirements was 
present in every conﬂ ict. In this sense, the systems-theoretical approach has already proved useful. 
Second, the analysis of the manifest constitutional conﬂ icts allowed the two general hypotheses to 
be expanded into eight detailed hypotheses on the occurrence of constitutional conﬂ icts. Naturally, 
the case studies can only be discussed in general terms; therefore, this article will mainly focus on 
highlighting the kinds of conﬂ ict which occurred in these two countries (for more details, see Hein 
2011).
In Bulgaria, constitutional conﬂ icts had already commenced in 1991:5
– In 1991/1992, 1994 and 1998/1999, there were three virulent constitutional conﬂ icts pertaining to 
the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council—the judiciary’s self-administration organ. In all 
three cases, a new government attempted to conduct the council members’ re-election prior to 
the regular end of its ﬁ ve-year term. In 1994, the government also tried, albeit without success, 
to remove the prosecutor general and the president of the Supreme Court from oﬃ  ce. In 1999, 
the government actively supported the election of its favourite candidate as prosecutor general. 
The common goal in all three conﬂ icts was to establish political control over the judicial system’s 
personnel policy. While one of these eﬀ orts failed, two were successful.
– In 1995, Bulgaria experienced a turbulent conflict pertaining to the independence of the judiciary 
and the constitutional court. In this case, the newly elected socialist government tried to weaken 
the judiciary by presenting a budget law without a separate section for the Supreme Judicial 
Council, as is stipulated by the constitution. Subsequently, the government attempted to evict the 
constitutional court judges from office by citing some practical reasons as a paltry justification of 
its act. However, both these decisions were successfully annulled by the constitutional court.
– In 1996, there was an intense conflict associated with the establishment of two new highest-
authority courts, the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court. In order 
to exert political influence on the new courts, the socialist government attempted—without 
success—to postpone the appointments of the courts’ presidents until new regular elections to 
the Supreme Judicial Council could be held.
– The years 2003/2004 saw another hostile conflict over the election of the president of the 
Supreme Administrative Court. In this instance, the liberal government successfully obviated the 
appointment of a candidate associated with the parliamentary opposition (cf. Hein 2006: 177-180).
– Finally, from 2002 to 2009, Bulgaria underwent a long-lasting constitutional conflict concerning 
the prospects of judicial reform and related constitutional amendments. In the course of this 
conflict, the judiciary and the constitutional court systematically expanded their powers, not only 
reducing the political scope of the parliament and the government but also raising the hurdles for 
constitutional amendments (cf. Hein 2006, 2007).
5  For a general overview of the political and legal developments in Bulgaria since 1989 see Ganev (2007), Bell (1998) 
and Giatzidis (2002).
Constitutional Conﬂ icts between Politics and Law in Transition Societies: A Systems-Theoretical Approach 11
Similar to Bulgaria, Romania experienced its ﬁ rst constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law 
only after the ﬁ rst democratic change of government following the creation of its constitution. Unlike 
Bulgaria, however, in Romania, the socialist successor party to the former communists won both the 
founding elections in 1990 and the ﬁ rst elections under the new constitutional order in 1992. It took 
until the end of 1996 for a non-socialist coalition to win the parliamentary and presidential elections, 
and the year 1997 saw the ﬁ rst constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law:6
– The ﬁ rst conﬂ ict in 1997 revolved around the new government’s attempts at judicial reform. 
During this conﬂ ict, the government successfully changed the leadership of the highly politicised 
procuracy.
– From 2001 to 2003, the newly elected socialist government tried to (re-)politicise the judiciary, with 
tremendous success. This included many attempts to control the ordinary courts’ adjudication 
and a very controversial election of members to the Superior Council of Magistracy.
– In 2005, Romania experienced a conﬂ ict regarding the enactment of the new parliamentary 
majority’s package of judicial reform laws. These laws were partly abrogated by a controversial 
constitutional court decision. The conﬂ ict triggered a grave crisis of the government which 
entailed the non-implementation of several central parts of the reform package.
– Since 2006, the president, government, parliament, judiciary and the constitutional court have 
struggled to ﬁ le criminal cases, particularly corruption cases, against current or former members 
of government. Until now, not a single former or current (prime) minister has been convicted or 
sentenced for any crime, including corruption (cf. Hein 2009).
As expected, the integration of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union (EU) (cf. Grabbe 
2006) signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uenced the course of these abovementioned conﬂ icts. Above all, it largely (re-)
directed the reform policies of both countries with respect to the judiciary and the ﬁ ght against 
corruption. This inﬂ uence, however, did not invariably have a positive impact (see Smilov 2006). 
In some cases, the EU acted on the basis of inadequate problem perceptions and enforced reform 
packages that intensiﬁ ed the existing conﬂ icts or provoked new ones instead of promoting helpful 
solutions. This was especially true during some phases of the conﬂ ict pertaining to judicial reform 
and related constitutional amendments that occurred in Bulgaria between 2002 and 2009 (Hein 2007, 
cf. Olteanu & Autengruber 2007). In any case, integration into the EU did not, in general, inﬂ uence the 
occurrence or intensity of these conﬂ icts. In fact, these countries saw a number of conﬂ icts before the 
commencement of the integration process in addition to some conﬂ icts that were independent from 
the concrete integration policies. Apart from EU integration, all the conﬂ icts were caused or at least 
facilitated by certain constitutional rules.
Constitutional confl icts between politics and law—where and why?
As this brief overview of the two case studies has illustrated, the large majority of situations that lead 
to constitutional conﬂ icts are not only accidentally associated with the conﬁ guration of the judiciary 
and the constitutional court. In fact, it is here that the tension between the functional checks and 
balances between the diﬀ erent state organs, on the one hand, and the dysfunctional political inﬂ uences 
on the legal sphere—or vice versa—on the other hand are much stronger than at any other point in 
constitutional orders. In contrast, it is diﬃ  cult to implement workable arrangements that target the 
diﬀ erentiation of politics and law. Therefore, only one of the following eight hypotheses is related 
to the executive and legislative branches. Altogether, the situations which can trigger constitutional 
conﬂ icts can be subdivided into three groups:
6  For a general overview of the political and legal developments in Romania since 1989, see Gallagher (2008), Carey 
(2004) and Mungiu-Pippidi (1999).
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– The first group comprises judicial institutions, where certain circumstances allow legal questions 
to be decided on the basis of political criteria. In concrete terms, two hypotheses deal with the 
ordinary courts while another two are concerned with the procuracy.
– The next ‘group’ is associated with only one hypothesis which describes a constellation wherein 
political institutions get the opportunity to decide legal questions based on political criteria. 
This hypothesis focuses on certain unlegislated areas of personal immunity in the executive and 
legislative branches.
– The final group comprises decisions taken at the interface between politics and law, that is, the 
constitutional court. This organisation systematically allows for the decision of legal questions 
based on political criteria and vice versa (three hypotheses).
The following sections will systematically elaborate on these eight hypotheses in order to substantiate 
this article’s central argument.
Politicised decisions in judicial institutions (I): The ordinary courts
For the administration of the judiciary, it is essential to pay close attention to three areas: the 
organisation of the judicial branch, its ﬁ nancial management and the personnel policy—including, 
above all, the appointment of judges and prosecutors. For courts and judges, that is, for proper 
adjudication, the problem would be as follows: on the one hand, the courts have to be protected 
from direct political inﬂ uences in order to ensure the autonomy of the legal system. On the other 
hand, the organisational isolation of the courts presents the risk of producing a uniﬁ ed and separate 
judicial class. Such a class would not only go beyond the scope of democratic policy-making but also 
be susceptible to politicisation eﬀ orts at the informal level. Hence, we can empirically often ﬁ nd 
connections between all three areas of the judiciary’s administration and the legislative as well as 
executive branches.
Constitutional conﬂ icts can be ignited by ordinary courts due to the problematic nature of the 
independence of justice principle. This does not simply mean freedom for judges, since that would 
include a right to submit to any interest they deem suitable. On the contrary, ‘judicial independence is 
not an intrinsic (ultimate) value, but merely an instrumental one. What is to be achieved is safeguarding 
of another value, namely the impartiality of the judge’ (Bobek 2008: 101). Therefore, independent 
Table 1. Dimensions of the independence of justice
Party detachment Political insularity
Formal 
level
constitution (e.g. right to recuse appointment 
of judges)
laws and other legal norms (e.g. suﬃ  cient sala-
ries in order to prevent corruption)
constitution (e.g. ban on transfer, promotion or 
removal from oﬃ  ce without consent)
laws and other legal norms (e.g. suﬃ  cient ﬁ nan-
cial resources for the courts)
Informal 
level
political and legal culture
absence of clientelism
absence of judges’ interference on the basis of 
their political orientation
absence of judges’ interference on the basis of 
private relations
absence of judges’ interference with the public
legitimacy of the court
political and legal culture
absence of clientelism
absence of judges’ interference on the basis of 
their political orientation
no refusal by other state organs to implement 
court decisions
Source: author’s compilation, based on Fiss 1993: 58–60
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judges are bound to the law in order to ensure the autonomy of the legal system. For this reason, it 
is necessary to distinguish between two aspects of judicial independence (see Fiss 1993: 58-60). First, 
there is the independence from all interests present in a trial or party detachment. Second, there is the 
independence from political instructions regarding the current activity or political insularity. These 
aspects have to be observed both at the formal and informal level. Thus, there are four dimensions 
of judicial independence which provide for the identiﬁ cation of several factors that institutionalise 
this independence (see Table 1). This leads to the following conclusion: if the independence of justice 
is limited to the formal level, the courts might be informally politicised by the government and 
other political actors, most notably the opposition. If, in contrast, protection only exists with regard 
to political insularity, the judges might also be susceptible to political interests present in a trial. 
Therefore, the politicisation of the judiciary can be obviated only if all four dimensions of judicial 
independence are eﬀ ectively protected.
The real diﬃ  culty lies in ﬁ nding a way to organise the judiciary democratically, which not only 
ensures judicial independence but also leaves the judiciary adequately equipped to deal with the 
tasks at hand. Empirically, we can observe a number of distinct models of judiciary administration. 
Concerning transition societies in Central and Eastern Europe, Sergio Bartole (1998) has identiﬁ ed four 
models with an increasing amount of political inﬂ uence on the judiciary.
(1) The judicial self-management model is notably patterned after the experiences of Italy and France 
and can, for example, be found in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. Here, the judiciary largely organises 
itself autonomously by means of a special judicial council. The government, therefore, has very limited 
inﬂ uence on judicial power. The legislature participates only in the election of council members, if at 
all. In contrast to the Italian and French archetypes, the Southeast European councils not only deal 
with the judiciary’s personnel policy but also have substantial competences in the budgeting and 
organisation of the judicial branch. Even projects of law concerning the judiciary have to be reviewed 
by these councils before their enactment. The decisive advantage of this model is that the judiciary 
is protected from direct political inﬂ uences. Potential problems could arise from two sources: from 
the indirect politicisation of council members, since they are elected by the parliament, and from the 
possibility of the emergence of a uniﬁ ed and separate judicial class.
(2) The mixed model, present in Lithuania, Macedonia and Slovenia, combines elements of judicial 
self-organisation with management by the executive and/or legislative branches. The judicial councils 
mainly perform consultant, recommendatory or approving functions. Nevertheless, the executive 
and/or legislative branches have to cooperate with them.
(3) The management by the executive model is notably based on the German experience and, for 
instance, has been established in the Czech Republic. There, the government (i.e. the ministry of 
justice) almost entirely commands the administration of the judiciary. The most crucial advantage 
for transition societies is that these ‘procedures and solutions certainly do not favour a tendency of 
magistrates to form a uniﬁ ed separate corps’ (Bartole 1998: 67).7 Even though this model has some 
advantages with regard to judicial reform and ﬁ nancial management, it can, nevertheless, generate 
signiﬁ cant impairments to judicial independence. Therefore, this independence is secured by means 
of extensive individual rights for judges, for instance, through a ban on the transfer, promotion or 
removal of a judge without the consent of the person concerned. The success of this construction 
depends ﬁ rstly on a working parliamentary control of the executive. This is particularly precarious in 
parliamentary democracies with an overlap between the government and the parliamentary majority. 
Secondly, it is necessary to ensure the legal protection of judges’ rights, which is even more precarious 
when the judiciary is administrated by the executive branch.
7  For details on the resistance against judicial reform attempts which nevertheless appeared within the Czech 
magistracy and the constitutional conﬂ icts provoked by means of constitutional court decisions, see Bobek 
(2008).
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(4) Finally, the management by the legislative and executive model simply does not show any 
diﬀ erentiation between politics and law. In this model, all important decisions in the ﬁ elds of 
organisation, ﬁ nancial administration and personnel policy are taken by the head of state, the 
government or the parliament using some kind of cooperation mechanism. Therefore, this model is 
characterised by the domination of politics over law. This model, for example, can be found in the 
Russian Federation, the Ukraine and Belarus, where it ‘resembles the archetype of Soviet constitutions’ 
(Bartole 1998: 68). These post-socialist countries, incidentally, appear to have developed into deﬁ cient 
democracies if not (semi-) autocracies, given their modest implementation of democratisation and 
rule of law.
Apart from the problem of adequate equipment, the two dimensions of political insularity are 
particularly crucial with regard to judicial independence. If court organisation is patterned after the 
management by the executive model, the courts do, in fact, become part of the executive branch, and 
decisions pertaining to the appointment of judges can be taken by politicians. However, political 
insularity and thereby the diﬀ erentiation between politics and law can be ensured, as mentioned 
above, by providing extensive individual rights for judges. In any case, this construction is precarious 
because, apart from the general parliamentary control over the government, this model contains 
no institutional checks and balances for stabilising the judiciary. The judicial self-management model, 
in contrast, provides a much greater level of security for judicial independence but simultaneously 
presents the risk of the emergence of a uniﬁ ed and separate judicial class, which can potentially exceed 
the scope of democratic policy-making and be susceptible to politicisation eﬀ orts at the informal level. 
In both the ideal-typical cases, there are high chances of constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and 
law because these cases allow for the decision of legal questions on the basis of political criteria. In 
short, the conﬂ ict probability looks like an inverted Gaussian bell curve. The ﬁ rst detailed hypotheses 
(D), therefore, are as follows:
Hypothesis D1: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if the executive and 
legislative branches do not or only marginally participate in the judiciary’s administration.
Hypothesis D2: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if the executive 
and legislative inﬂ uences on the judicial branch exceed a certain level of functional checks and 
balances.
Politicised decisions in judicial institutions (II): The procuracy
The procuracy is an integral part of the legal system. Its main task is the prosecution of criminal 
behaviour, that is, the preparation for adjudication. From the organisational point of view, we ﬁ nd an 
assignment to both the executive branch (based on the ‘Prussian model’) and the judiciary (based on 
the ‘Italian model’).8 Although the arguments concerning the procuracy are largely congruent with 
those related to the courts, the results of the case studies on Bulgaria and Romania clearly suggest 
a model for the organisation of the procuracy that will maintain a low probability of constitutional 
conﬂ ict. This model is the Italian one.
To begin with, the Prussian model has two favourable aspects: First, this model deﬁ nes the 
prosecution of oﬀ enses as not being a part of the core of jurisdiction. In consequence, it can be 
organised as a checks-and-balances mechanism between the government and the courts. Second, 
the police authorities doubtlessly belong to the executive branch, and without them, it is simply 
impossible to bring about a successful prosecution of criminal cases. Therefore, it would be reasonable 
to combine the procuracy and the police in the executive branch. However, this entails the peril 
of political infringements on the prosecutors’ work, which in turn endangers the independence 
8  For more information on both models, see Roxin (1997: 110–113), György (1996: 20–21) and Di Federico (1998: 
375–378).
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of justice. This particularly holds true if the leading prosecutors maintain the status of ‘political 
executives’ (politische Beamte), who are subordinated to the supervision of the ministry of justice 
and can be retired at any time without justiﬁ cation. This has been the case in Germany for a long 
time and this setup continues to be practiced there at the federal level and in several federal states 
(see Rautenberg 2003: 170–174). This particularly jeopardises the prosecution of criminal oﬀ enses 
committed by members of government, most notably if the prosecutors ‘act as gatekeepers to the 
judiciary’ (Aaken et al. 2004: 262)—that is, if they enjoy the monopoly to indict oﬀ enders for their 
crimes. At ﬁ rst glance, this problem is apparently resolvable by a formal separation of the procuracy 
within the executive branch from the current government’s political goals. This can be done by means 
of a number of formal rules (cf. Aaken et al. 2004: 266–273):
– Personal independence for the prosecutors through extensive individual rights, notably including a 
ban on the transfer, promotion or removal of a prosecutor from office without the consent of the 
person concerned
– A prohibition on the minister of justice to give direct orders to the procuracy in concrete cases as 
well as in questions of general interest
– A term duration for the head of the procuracy that is longer than, or at least not congruent with, 
the executive’s regular term, combined with a ban on reappointment
– A complementary distribution of the right to indict to other state organs (for instance the police, 
as in Norway), to non-governmental organisations (as in Germany in the ﬁ eld of environmental 
law), to the victim of a crime and so on
– The principle of mandatory prosecution of major crimes, which does not leave the decision of 
whether or not to bring a case to court to the discretion of the prosecutors. This principle can be 
combined with a judicial review of the procuracy’s decision to start or refuse the prosecution of 
minor crimes
– A working parliamentary control of the government
However, an organisational structure patterned along these recommendations would be a paradox: it 
would inevitably produce a serious problem of governability, due to the presence of a self-contained 
room of governance within the executive branch, which would be inaccessible to the government 
while at the same time being part of its political accountability. In addition, the procuracy would still 
be susceptible to politicisation eﬀ orts at the informal level.
It would be more reasonable to have an organisational assignment of the procuracy to the judicial 
branch patterned after the Italian model. In this case, other state organs such as the head of state, 
government, parliament or the courts have to exercise control over the procuracy’s functioning. This 
can be achieved through the possibility of conducting eﬀ ective impeachment proceedings against the 
head of the procuracy through a combination of a parliamentary initiative with a binding court decision. 
Furthermore, the head of the procuracy can be appointed by the parliament based on a qualiﬁ ed 
majority vote, in combination with a ban on reappointment and a term duration which outlasts the 
regular legislative period. In addition, this structure can incorporate some of the abovementioned 
rules such as the principle of mandatory prosecution, judicial review of the procuracy’s decision to 
start or refuse a prosecution and a wider distribution of the right to indict. Moreover, the prevalent 
practice of assigning decisional authority to the head of the procuracy, in particular, needs to be 
brought under legal supervision. The addition of these organisational elements should suﬃ  ciently 
prevent politicisation at the informal level. In contrast, we can identify two constellations which 
provide for the decision of legal questions based on political criteria and, therefore, account for a 
high probability of constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law. The resultant third and fourth 
detailed hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis D3: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if the procuracy is 
organisationally assigned to the executive branch.
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Hypothesis D4: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if the procuracy is 
organised as part of the judiciary in a way that it cannot be controlled by the executive and 
legislative branches through working checks and balances.
The few empirical research results in this ﬁ eld already support these hypotheses. Cross-national 
analyses have already revealed that the independence of prosecution agencies from the executive 
branch reduces government corruption to a large extent (Aaken et al. 2010).
Judicial decisions in political institutions: Unlegislated areas of personal immunity in the 
executive and legislative branches
In the course of the two exploratory case studies, it was possible to determine only one but, nevertheless, 
very crucial point in the constitutional orders, where political institutions were enabled to decide legal 
questions based on political criteria. Some constitutions, by providing for personal immunity rights, 
establish spheres of social action that are hardly accessible or even inaccessible to the legal system 
and, therefore, constitute sources for constitutional conﬂ icts. Such rights are typically assigned to 
members of parliament, members of government, prosecutors and (constitutional) judges. There is 
a classic justiﬁ cation for the immunity of the ﬁ rst group in the sense of safeguarding the legislature 
against infringements by the executive branch (see Hulst 2000: 78-80). Moreover, parliamentary 
immunity is an important instrument to ensure the legislature’s independent emergence from the 
government in the ﬁ rst phase of democratic transition. The same argument applies to prosecutors, 
constitutional judges and ordinary court judges. An analogous justiﬁ cation, however, does not 
exist for the members of government: against whom do they want to be protected? Paradoxically, 
constitutional orders that immunise members of government against criminal prosecution (as found 
in France, Romania, Lithuania and Greece) design this protection to be even more comprehensive than 
that for their deputies. The latter are safeguarded only against imprisonment and conviction for the 
duration of their mandate, while the former cannot even be brought under investigation without the 
consent of either the parliament, the head of state or a specialised committee. In addition, immunity 
often applies to former members of government as well.
From the systems-theoretical point of view, the protection of judges and prosecutors is functional 
as far as it safeguards central institutions of the legal system and the structural coupling of politics 
and law against destructive political inﬂ uences. In contrast, the immunity of members of government 
and members of parliament is dysfunctional because it allows political dominance over certain legal 
questions. Thereby, politicians can eﬀ ectively protect themselves from being prosecuted for criminal 
oﬀ enses. This is especially, though not solely, relevant in many transition societies. Due to the local, 
often problematic political culture of the political elite, we cannot expect politicians to pass requests 
from the procuracy to allow criminal prosecution against ‘their own kind’.9 In today’s consolidated 
democracies, parliamentary immunity incidentally does not have a more or less symbolic character. 
This is because deputies no longer need to be protected against illegal executive attacks aimed at 
producing or obviating certain voting results in the legislature. Hence, the ﬁ fth detailed hypothesis 
is as follows:
Hypothesis D5: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if a constitution 
provides personal immunity rights for members of parliament or members of government.
Decisions at the interface between politics and law: The constitutional court
The last three hypotheses concern the central institution at the interface between politics and law: 
the constitutional court. Owing to the fact that virtually all transition societies which introduced 
constitutional review have opted for either a separate constitutional court or a specialised section in the 
9   This is, for instance, the case in Romania (see Hall 2004: 215, Hein 2009).
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highest court (cf. Ginsburg 2003, González Marcos 2003, Schwartz 1993), the following considerations 
primarily refer to specialised courts. Regardless of the fact that the arguments regarding the 
independence of justice concern both ordinary and constitutional courts, these institutions have to 
be discussed separately in the systems-theoretical perspective, because constitutional courts cannot 
be characterised as communicating primarily in either the legal or the political system. Although a 
constitutional review is subject to ‘the requirements and conditions of a court of law’, it is certainly 
not ‘detached from the gravitation ﬁ eld of contention for gaining, exercising and preserving political 
power’ (Böckenförde 1999: 10–11, cf. Grimm 2000: 115). Moreover, the constitutional court is the 
organisation that stabilises the constitution as a structural coupling between politics and law (see 
Bornemann 2007: 83-84). Hence, constitutional courts act systematically both in the legal and the political 
systems. Almost every judgment has some consequences on the legal system (e.g. the abrogation of 
an unconstitutional law) and the political system (e.g. the retroactive defeat of the parliamentary 
majority that enacted this law).
The political and legal consequences of constitutional court communications ‘are completely 
diﬀ erent because they occur in diﬀ erent systems and in diﬀ erent recursive networks under diﬀ erent 
criteria and concrete conditions’ (Luhmann 1991: 1435). Consequently, the function of a constitutional 
review clearly surpasses that of the judiciary because the interpretation of the often vague and 
amenable constitutional law not only allows for constitutional adjudication but also de facto for 
constitution-making. The court does not merely ﬁ ll the legal ‘gaps’ left open by the legislature; by 
means of its interpretations, it transforms or even reinvents constitutional norms, for example, in the 
light of changing societal circumstances. Therefore, constitutional courts are systematically required 
to make political decisions regardless of whether or not the current legal doctrines concede this (see 
Kelsen 1929). In this manner, constitutional courts possess a unique interpretive power. This is the 
real problem associated with organising a constitutional court. Although communicating both in 
the legal and the political systems, it has to be an independent court in order to prevent the political 
interests of the legislative or executive branches from being directly transferred to the court, which 
would endanger the court’s adjudication as adjudication. The absence of such independence would 
jeopardise the diﬀ erentiation of politics from law and could potentially culminate in the dominance 
of politics over law. Constitutional courts, per se, have some leeway for making decisions based on 
political criteria. However, if this margin is too wide, and if the court is dependent on the political 
interests of other state powers, constitutional conﬂ icts will be provoked.
‘Without a constitutional court’, however, ‘a constitution is tongueless in conﬂ ict situations’ 
(Vorländer 2006: 12). If successful, a constitutional review may strengthen the constitution’s function 
as a structural coupling of politics and law. In order to attain this objective, constitutional courts are 
sometimes organisationally assigned to the judicial branch, notably in older constitutional texts (e.g. 
in the German Grundgesetz of 1949). The majority of the subsequently established constitutions of 
transition societies reﬂ ect the speciﬁ city of the constitutional review and provide a separate chapter 
for the constitutional court. Regardless of these organisational opportunities, the dual status of the 
relationship between politics and law often facilitates the central role played by constitutional courts 
in constitutional conﬂ icts. Since these courts regularly take important political decisions, they are of 
outstanding interest to political actors. Therefore, the decisive factors that explain the occurrence of 
constitutional conﬂ icts which involve these courts are (1) the independence of the judges, (2) their 
appointment rules and (3) the existence of legislative control mechanisms.
(1) Constitutional orders can only ensure the independence of constitutional judges at the formal 
level (see Table 1). This can be done by means of suﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial and organisational resources, 
a long-lasting but non-renewable mandate, the absence of external impeachment proceedings, the 
18 Michael Hein
requirement of a long-term professional experience or a minimum age for the appointment of judges 
and the total absence of any opportunity for the legislature to overrule constitutional court decisions 
through a simple vote. Naturally, even the combination of all these elements cannot entirely obviate 
‘a self-politicisation of constitutional courts whose members voluntarily toe political party lines’ 
(Grimm 2001: 188). However, without adequate protection of the judges’ independence at the formal 
level, constitutional conﬂ icts are much more likely. On this basis, the sixth detailed hypothesis is as 
follows:
Hypothesis D6: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if the independence 
of the constitutional judges is not empirically ensured in all its four dimensions of formal and 
informal party detachment and political insularity.
If judicial independence is limited to the formal level only, the courts might be informally politicised 
both by the government and by any other political actor (most notably, the opposition). Paradoxically, 
an exceptionally high degree of formal independence could even encourage a certain degree of 
politicisation at the informal level.
(2) The independence of constitutional judges is especially imperilled if the ‘political’ institutions 
themselves elect their own controllers. Unfortunately, the most obvious solution to this problem—
to choose constitutional judges by lot from a previously deﬁ ned group of qualiﬁ ed jurists—has only 
been implemented in Greece so far.10 The majority of states have instead opted for election modes 
which generally incorporate several state organs in proportional or sequential procedures11 and often 
stipulate the requirement of qualiﬁ ed majorities in the case of parliamentary elections. However, 
the empirical eﬀ ects of all these modes largely depend on informal inﬂ uences, for example, the 
fragmentation of the party system. The development of the consolidated democracies in Western and 
Southern Europe has shown that ‘a combination of formal and informal rules and practices exclude 
strong party activists from the list of potential nominees. This refers to persons who have openly 
demonstrated and widely publicised their ideological views on controversial political issues. As a 
consequence, moderates are favoured over fanatics’ (Alivizatos 1995: 577).
By reversing the abovementioned requirements for the appointment of nonpartisan constitutional 
judges, we can arrive at the seventh detailed hypothesis:
Hypothesis D7: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if the appointment 
rules for constitutional judges do not provide for the appointment of nonpartisan judges.
(3) The question of legislative control mechanisms vis-à-vis the constitutional court is related to the 
contingency problem of judicial interpretation. Owing to the previously stated fact that constitutional 
law is often vague and of fundamental character, the courts have ample scope to interpret it and are 
relatively unpredetermined in their concretion of the constitutional norms. Even if the constitutional 
text itself contains instructions on how to observe and describe its norms, this does not lead to a 
general limitation of interpretation (Grimm 2000: 113). The problem, therefore, is how ‘to draw the line 
between interpretations that can be legitimised within a democratic rule of law and interpretations 
not attributable to the constitutional and legal texts in accordance with the rule of law principle’ 
(Neves 2000: 157). However, there is no easy solution to this problem. Neither can a plausible answer 
be found by means of scientiﬁ c methods nor is there an airtight model of court organisation. It would 
also be problematic to dispense with the indisputable advantages of a constitutional review for the 
stability and eﬀ ectiveness of a constitutional order.
The solution can only be found beyond the ﬁ eld of interpretation. In principle, the constituent 
power—that is, the parliament and potentially the constituency—should be empowered to reverse 
all the decisions of the constitutional court by means of regular constitutional amendments. ‘The 
legitimacy of independent constitutional review paradoxically lies in its institutional vulnerability. Its 
10  For the history of the lot as a political decision and allocation procedure and the arguments that speak in favour 
of lotteries, see Buchstein (2010).
11  Even co-optative elements are applied (e.g. in Portugal).
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authority is regarded as accepted exactly because in a serious conﬂ ict situation there is no need for 
democratic politics to accept its decisions’ (Scharpf 2005: 723).12 In fact, we seldom observe the use 
of this legislative control mechanism. However, it is also true that serious conﬂ icts can be provoked 
due to the absence of a viable opportunity to amend the constitution. This can take the form of 
eternity clauses (e.g. in Germany) or be manifest in constitutional court decisions that narrow the 
opportunities for constitutional amendments (e.g. in Bulgaria). In addition, barring clauses that ban 
new judgments on issues that have already been decided can potentially intensify conﬂ ict situations. 
These elements establish legal spheres that are beyond the political system’s scope of democratic 
legislation and which therefore endanger the structural coupling of politics and law. Thus, the ﬁ nal 
detailed hypothesis is given as follows:
Hypothesis D8: Constitutional conﬂ icts between politics and law will occur if the constituent 
power has no viable opportunity to amend the constitution in order to reverse constitutional 
court decisions.
Conclusion: Constitutional confl icts as ‘engines of consolidation’
This paper has presented a general explanation of the occurrence of constitutional conﬂ icts between 
politics and law in transition societies. On the basis of a systems-theoretical understanding of politics 
and law, it was possible to deduce two general hypotheses claiming that constitutional conﬂ icts will 
occur under two circumstances: ﬁ rst, if a constitutional order allows for the decision of legal questions 
based on political criteria or vice versa, and second, if a constitutional order provides the judiciary 
or the constitutional court the opportunity to decide political questions based on political criteria. 
Within the narrow bounds of two exploratory case studies on the constitutional conﬂ icts that have 
occurred in Bulgaria and Romania since 1991, these general hypotheses were conﬁ rmed. Therefore, 
these hypotheses can be regarded as valid at least for the post-socialist transitional context of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Following the case studies, these assumptions were further expanded into eight 
detailed hypotheses on the question of when, in constitutional orders, and under what circumstances 
constitutional conﬂ icts can be expected. Future cross-national and cross-regional analyses can be 
conducted to test the validity of these detailed hypotheses.
It should be noted that these eight hypotheses cannot be considered independent from one another. 
On the basis of these hypotheses, one can expect a substantial amount of reciprocal eﬀ ects which are either 
conﬂ ict-provoking or, paradoxically as it may seem, conﬂ ict-avoiding. The probability of constitutional 
conﬂ icts involving the constitutional court will indeed be higher if neither the independence of the 
constitutional judges is ensured in all four dimensions (D6) nor their appointment rules provide for 
the appointment of nonpartisan judges (D7). In contrast, however, the existence of personal immunity 
rights for members of parliament or members of government (D5) will not provoke constitutional 
conﬂ icts if the procuracy is controlled by the current political majority (D3). Correspondingly, the 
fact that the parliament has no viable opportunity to amend the constitution in order to reverse 
constitutional court decisions (D8) is not likely to cause constitutional conﬂ icts if the constitutional 
judges are dependent on the current parliamentary majority due to the presence of appointment rules 
which do not provide for the appointment of nonpartisan judges (D7). Nevertheless, with respect to the 
question of the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, such conﬂ ict-avoiding constellations 
can certainly not be considered unproblematic. The abovementioned constellations feature the sectoral 
superordination of politics over law and, therefore, establish enclaves characterised by the absence of 
both democracy and the rule of law. Hence, the presence of such constellations might be an attempt 
to explain failing transitions. In general, further research on constitutional conﬂ icts might lead to more 
12  This argument dates back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s (1835: 100–101) comparison of the amendable US constitution 
and the unamendable French basic law.
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in-depth insights into the scope of newly established institutions, because these conﬂ icts point to weak 
implementation of democratic decisions. If, for instance, ordinary courts are controlled by judges who 
were politically appointed by a former government (D1), these courts can obstruct the decisions of new 
parliamentary majorities by intentionally misinterpreting or simply ignoring new laws.
In the end, this article concludes that constitutional conﬂ icts in transition societies do not 
inevitably impede but may instead advance the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. 
Hence, such conﬂ icts can be regarded as ‘engines of consolidation’. In fact, it is improbable, if not 
impossible, for post-autocratic constitution- and institution-making to immediately produce ‘perfect’ 
constitutional orders. On the contrary, new constitutional orders are more likely to comprise some 
problematic elements which will eventually provoke conﬂ icts. Furthermore, it is apparently possible 
for even long-lived democracies to possess or even introduce problematic constitutional rules that will 
provoke manifest conﬂ icts in a longer course of time. Due to this possibility, the hypotheses developed 
here might be applicable not only to transition societies but also to consolidated democracies. With 
respect to the consolidation of newly established democracies, the decisive question is whether their 
constitutional orders allow them and the respective political actors are able and willing to settle 
problematic constitutional provisions by means of constitutional reforms. Concerning the relationship 
of politics and law, this is the key to the successful consolidation of democracy and the rule of law.   
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